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“THAT’S MY HOLDING AND I’M NOT STICKING 
TO IT!” COURT RULES THAT DEPRIVE 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF PRECEDENTIAL 
AUTHORITY DISTORT THE COMMON LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One hundred sixty-eight years ago, the venerated Supreme Court Justice 
Joseph Story made the following statement that still rings true today: “A 
more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, 
than that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to 




Unfortunately, the kind of “alarming doctrine” to which Justice Story 
referred occurs every day in the federal appellate courts
2
 as a result of 
publication plans
3
 that deprive unpublished opinions
4
 of precedential 
authority.
5





 1. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 377 
(1833), quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot on other 
grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).  
 2. Although the scope of this Note is limited to the federal appellate court rules that deprive 
unpublished opinions of precedential effect, state courts have similar rules. “In some state courts the 
proportion of unpublished rulings has climbed to more than 90 percent.” See, e.g., Mark D. Hinderks 
& Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law: A Proposal for the Elimination of Rules 
Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN 
L.J. 155, 159-65 (1992) (discussing state court rules that deprive unpublished opinions of precedential 
effect); William Glaberson, Unprecedented: Legal Shortcuts Run into Some Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2000, § 4, at 4; Peter A. Joy, Unpublished Opinions Stunt Common Law, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 
1996, at A19 (noting that “an increasing number of state courts have passed rules that forbid citation of 
unreported opinions”); Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 
2000 A.L.R. 5th 17 (2000) (collecting state cases that address state court publication rules).  
 3. See infra Part II.C. 
 4. The term “unpublished opinions” refers to judicial opinions that are not published in books. 
As discussed infra Part II.B, many unpublished opinions are accessible on-line through commercial 
computer databases. In addition, most circuit courts of appeals post their unpublished opinions on free 
Internet sites, but legal researchers are able to search for these opinions only by using the party name 
or date. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part II.C. 
 6. See infra Part II.C for an explanation of the criteria that judges are supposed to use in making 
their discretionary decisions whether or not to authorize the publication of an opinion.  
Each circuit’s publication plan contains rules that state whether the decision to publish an opinion will 
be made by the judge who writes the opinion or by a majority of the panel. Half the circuit courts leave 
the decision to the discretion of a single judge; the other circuits will only publish an opinion if a 
majority of the panel votes to do so. Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: 
Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 109, 121, 142 (1995). 
The circuit court rules that leave the decision to a single judge are the following: FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b); 
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the decision whether an opinion will be published or unpublished,
7
 judges are 
free to choose to deprive a case of future precedential authority by classifying 
it as an unpublished opinion.
8
 The publication plans thus give an appellate 
court the “liberty to disregard [its] former rules and decisions”
9
 whenever 
those former rules and decisions are set forth in an unpublished opinion.
10
 
Although the publication plans vary from circuit to circuit, all of the plans 
share a common element: unpublished opinions generally are not treated as 
precedent.
11
 Each of the appellate courts created its publication plan in the 
 
 
1ST CIR. R. 36.2(b); 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.2; 8TH CIR. R. APP. I, 3; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(g). 
The circuit court rules that require a majority vote of the panel before publishing an opinion are the 
following: 3D CIR. R. APP. I, I.O.P. 5.1.3; 6TH CIR. R. 36; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2. 
Finally, the following circuit courts allow either a single judge or a majority of the panel to order the 
publication of an opinion: 4TH CIR. R. 36(a) and 7TH CIR. R. 53(d)(2).  
 7. Of course, it is the publishing companies, not the judges, who ultimately “publish” the 
opinions. For the sake of simplicity, however, references in this Note to a judge’s decision to publish 
or not to publish an opinion will be used in place of references to a judge’s decision to authorize or not 
authorize an opinion. 
 8. Today, the word “unpublished” has become synonymous with “nonprecedential.” See, e.g., 
Jerome I. Braun, Eighth Circuit Decision Intensifies Debate over Publication and Citation of Appellate 
Opinions, 84 JUDICATURE 90, 91 (2000) (“The word ‘unpublished’ has become purely a term of art, 
actually meaning ‘non-precedential.’”). Judge Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals similarly noted that “one of the things that courts are doing . . . is to issue these so-called 
unpublished, nonprecedential, opinions.” Judge Richard S. Arnold, Address at the Washington 
University School of Law (Jan. 10, 2001) (videotape on file with Washington University School of 
Law). In fact, one pair of authors expressed their dissatisfaction with the use of unpublished, 
nonprecedential opinions by labeling these opinions with the oxymoron “non-precedential precedent”. 
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication 
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) 
[hereinafter Non-Precedential Precedent].  
 The fact that unpublished opinions lack future precedential authority significantly reduces judges’ 
incentive to spend as much time and care writing unpublished opinions as they spend writing 
published opinions. According to Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Richard Posner, “It is sort of a 
formula for irresponsibility . . . . Most judges, myself included, are not nearly as careful in dealing 
with unpublished decisions.” William Glaberson, Limited Reviews by Courts Raise Legal Rights 
Concerns, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 9, 1989, at A05.  
 Similarly, authors Reynolds and Richman state that “[i]t should come as no surprise that 
unpublished dispositions are also dreadful in quality.” William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, 
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL 
L. REV. 273, 284 (1996) [hereinafter Requiem]. 
 9. STORY, supra note 1, quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), 
vacated as moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 10. In Anastasoff, the seminal three-judge panel decision, Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold aptly 
stated that publication plans containing “rules like our Rule 28A(i) assert that courts have the 
following power: to choose for themselves, from among all the cases they decide, those that they will 
follow in the future, and those that they need not.” Anastoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th 
Cir.), vacated as moot on other grounds enbanc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 11. Braun, supra note 8, at 94. “All courts (except, now, the Eighth Circuit) agree that these 
opinions are not precedent.” Id. The word “generally” is used to qualify the statement that 
“unpublished opinions are not treated as precedent” because there are some extremely limited 
circumstances in which an unpublished opinion will be given precedential effect. See infra Part II.C. 
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 in response to increasing concern among members of the legal 
community that too many judicial opinions were being added to the case 
books each year.
13
 As the number of cases litigated per year grew at a 
daunting pace,
14
 judges and scholars became increasingly fearful that these 
judicial opinions would inundate legal libraries and bookshelves beyond 
capacity if measures were not taken to restrict the number of published 
opinions.
15
 Thus, the first publication plans specifically were designed to 





See also Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1997).  
 12. Each appellate court created its first publication plan in the early 1970s; however, the rules 
contained in each of the publication plans have always been subject to judicial modification or repeal 
by judicial vote at any time. In fact, each appellate court has changed and modified the rules contained 
in its publication plan since the plan’s original creation. See, e.g., David Dunn, Note, Unreported 
Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128, 128 n.4 (1977) (listing the 
original publication plans of the various circuits).  
 13. Although these fears actually culminated in the 1970s, they had caused concern “[e]ver since 
systematic reporting of judicial decisions first began in the 16th century.” Braun, supra note 8, at 90-
91. In 1671, for example, the English Chief Justice Hale described the collection of reported judicial 
opinions “as the rolling of a snowball, it increaseth in bulk in every age, until it becomes utterly 
unmanageable.” Id. at 91. Similarly an article written in 1824 laments that “[t]he multiplication of 
reports . . . is becoming an evil alarming and impossible to be born.” Bliss & White, The Common 
Law, 10 N. AM. REV. (n.s.) 411, 433 (1824), quoted in George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of 
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 478 (1986). In 1915, a jurist exclaimed, 
“The law library of the future staggers the imagination as one thinks of multitudes of shelves which 
will stretch away into the dim distance, rank upon rank, and tier upon tier . . . .” John B. Winslow, The 
Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL. L. REV. 157, 158 (1915), quoted in Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 
545. 
 14. See infra note 66 for a sample of statistics documenting the dramatic increase in federal 
courts of appeals cases. 
 Throughout the twentieth century, the increase in the number of cases litigated per year was 
inevitably accompanied by an increase in published opinions. See infra Part II.B. One scholar noted 
that “[t]he Federal Reporter now increases by 30 volumes a year” notwithstanding the fact that a large 
percentage of opinions are not even published. Braun, supra note 8, at 91. 
 15. The fears of judges and scholars that too many cases were being added to the books each year 
were ultimately voiced by the Judicial Conference of the United States. See infra Part II.B. In 1964, 
the Conference urged the federal appellate courts to publish solely the opinions “of general 
precedential value.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, in Reports of the 
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 11 (1964), quoted in Richard S. Arnold, 
Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS. 219, 219 (1999) [hereinafter 1964 
ANNUAL REPORT]. 
  16. See infra Part II.B. According to Judge Philip Nichols, Jr., for example, “The true reason 
behind the selective publication policy is that it is wrong to ask publishers to publish, libraries to 
collect, and scholars to read opinions that merely labor the obvious . . . rehashing conclusions already 
reached in authoritative decisions of the same court or the Supreme Court.” Philip Nichols, Jr., 
Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 909, 916 (1986). As 
discussed at length infra Part III, many other judges and scholars note that unpublished opinions often 
contain new and important rationale and, therefore, do not merely “rehash conclusions already 
reached” by the court.  
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American courts have always adhered to a common law system that is 
dependent upon precedent.
17
 Under our common law system, the natural 
evolution of case law occurs as each new judicial opinion is added to the 
river of precedent.
18
 The publication plans are an artificial impediment to this 
natural flow of precedent in the same way that a dam is an artificial 
impediment to the natural flow of a river. Just as a dam prevents a river from 
overflowing its physical boundaries, the federal appellate courts’ publication 
plans prevent the books that contain the cases from “overflowing” their 
physical boundaries of bookshelves and law libraries.
19
  
Appellate judges have complete control over which cases get past the 
“dam” and which do not.
20
 When judges make these discretionary decisions, 
they often inadvertently prevent important cases from joining the river of 
precedent.
21
 Such inadvertent obstruction of common law usually results 
from the fact that judges cannot always foresee which of their decisions will 
have future importance and which will not.
22
 However, some scholars and 
judges suggest that obstruction of common law is not always inadvertent.
23
 
For example, courts can use unpublished opinions potentially as a convenient 






 17. See infra Part II.D. As Justice Story long ago stated: 
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but the principles of the decision are held, 
as precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is the constant practice 
under our whole system of jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when they first 
emigrated to this country; and it is, and always has been considered, as the great security of our 
rights, our liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, 
and founded in permanent principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of judges. 
STORY, supra note 1, quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir.), vacated 
as moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 18. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “common law” as “[t]he body of law derived from judicial 
decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (7th ed. 1999). 
 19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part III for an analysis of how such publication plans artificially distort our 
common law system. For a discussion of precedent and stare decisis, see infra Part II.D. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra note 24. 
 24. One judge, for example, posed the following hypothetical scenario: “[I]f, after hearing 
argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached, but also believes that 
the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, assuming agreement by 
the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished opinion and sweeping the 
difficulties under the rug.” 1964 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 223. 
 Similarly, authors Reynolds and Richman warn that “complexity, like inconsistency, will not 
vanish by sweeping it under the rug.” Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 8, at 1191. For a 
detailed discussion of an unpublished opinion in which the Fourth Circuit may have “swept under the 
rug” a controversial decision, see infra text accompanying notes 149-61 (discussing Johnson v. 
Knable, No. 88-7729, 1988 WL 119136 (4th Cir. Oct. 31, 1988), cited in Slavitt, supra note 6, at 110, 
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This Note argues that our federal appellate courts desperately need a 





 grants to the United States Supreme Court the authority 
to “prescribe by general rules . . . the practice and procedure of the . . . courts 
of appeals.”
27
 This Note proposes that the Supreme Court grant precedential 
authority to all opinions, whether published or unpublished.
28
 Courts should 
grant precedential authority to all judicial opinions because the united 
doctrines of precedent
29
 and stare decisis
30
 are fundamental to the legitimate 
operation of the Judicial Branch.
31
 When court rules permit judges to make 
entirely discretionary decisions regarding which of their judicial opinions 
they will follow, and which ones they will not,
32
 our common law system of 
precedent is artificially distorted.
33
 In addition, whereas the doctrine of 
precedent has endured successfully in American courts for hundreds of years, 
the publication plans that violate that doctrine were created only twenty-
seven years ago.
34
   
Fortunately, we no longer need these publication plans that artificially 
dam the flow of precedent.
35
 The incredible advances in technology that have 
occurred throughout the past few decades, and that continue to improve 
every day, now will allow us to transcend the boundaries of physical storage 
space.
36
 Electronic databases such as Westlaw and LEXIS or devices used 
for data storage, such as CD-ROMs, possess digital storage capacities 
infinitely more vast than that of bookshelves.
37
 Every judicial opinion now 
can be published electronically.
38
 Therefore, we no longer need to limit the 




 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), cited in Dunn, supra note 12, at 147 n.120. 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), quoted in Dunn, supra note 12, at 147.  
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. See infra Part II.D. 
 30. See infra Part II.D. 
 31. See infra Part II.D. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part II.D. 
 35. See infra Part III. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
 37. See infra Part IV. The physical storage space required by a user of an electronic database is 
the space occupied by one computer and one printer. “One CD-ROM disc, which is wafer thin and a 
mere five inches in diameter, can store as much information as that contained in 30 to 60 printed 
volumes. The information contained in thousands of volumes can now be stored in a file cabinet.” 
Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 558. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
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space of bookshelves and law libraries.
39
 This Note proposes that the federal 
government provide funding for the creation of a single Web site designed 
solely for the electronic dissemination of judicial opinions.
40
 Computer 
experts could design a search engine similar to the ones used by LEXIS and 
Westlaw to facilitate a legal researcher’s access to relevant judicial opinions 
when the researcher does not already know the party names or dates of the 
relevant cases.
41
 This search engine would allow researchers to perform 
sophisticated word searches using Boolean logic.
42
 Because this Web site 
would not attempt to make a profit, unlike commercial research databases, 
access fees would be substantially less than those of the major providers, 
LEXIS and Westlaw, and, perhaps, could even be free for the public.
43
  
Part II of this Note examines the histories of published opinions, of 
computer-assisted legal research, of unpublished opinions in the federal 
appellate courts, and of precedent and stare decisis. Part III of this Note 
analyzes the ways in which the publication plans violate the doctrines of 
precedent and stare decisis and artificially distort our common law system. 
Part IV of this Note proposes a solution to the problems created by the 
existing publication plans of the federal appellate courts. 
II. HISTORY/OVERVIEW 
A. History of Published Opinions 
The publication of judicial decisions has been a common thread running 
through the English legal system for many centuries. From 1292 to 1535, 
unofficial manuscript law reports called Year Books contained descriptions 





 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. See infra Part IV. As discussed supra note 2, the scope of this Note is limited to the federal 
appellate courts’ publication plans. However, a strong argument can be made that the Web site urged 
by this Proposal should include all judicial opinions, whether federal appellate court decisions, federal 
district court decisions, or state court decisions. 
 41. See infra note 42. 
 42. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. Although most circuit courts post their unpublished 
opinions on electronic bulletin boards that are accessible to the public via the Internet, legal 
researchers are able to search for these decisions only by party name or date. For example, the Eighth 
Circuit maintains an electronic bulletin board. United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit 
Official Web Site, available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). This Note 
urges the implementation of the more user-friendly means of finding relevant cases. See infra Part IV.  
 43. See infra Part IV.  
 44. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 15, 17 (1987) [hereinafter Form Molds Substance] (citing F. HICKS, MATERIALS AND 
METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH WITH BIBLIOGRAPHICAL MANUAL 94-102 (1923)). 
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Publishers eventually replaced the Year Books with unofficial nominative 
case reporters, which individual members of the bar created from their 
collections of notes discussing judicial decisions.
45
 In 1571, Edmund 
Plowden published the first nominative case reporter, called “Les 
Comentaires, ou les Reportes.”
46
 In the years following the American 
Revolution, nominative case reporters emerged in America.
47
 The desire for 
an “American” common law—separate and distinct from the laws of 
England—was a major impetus in the widespread adoption of reporters, 
beginning with Ephraim Kirby’s 1789 Connecticut Reports.
48
 By 1803, a 
number of jurisdictions had initiated the publication of “official” reports of 
their judicial decisions.
49
 The official reports were more objectively written 




John B. West transformed America’s legal reporting system when he 
founded and incorporated the West Publishing Company in 1882.
51
 West 
embarked on his journey at the young age of twenty-four, when he convinced 
his older brother to help him develop a weekly legal news sheet called “The 
Syllabi.”
52
 This publication gained immediate popularity among members of 
the bar and ultimately led to the National Reporter System.
53
 The 
ingeniousness of the National Reporter System was its goal “to collect, 
arrange in an orderly manner and put into convenient and inexpensive form 
 
 
 45. Form Molds Substance, supra note 44, at 17 (citing HICKS, supra note 44, at 96). These 
collections of notes included those taken by lawyers and judges, in addition to the compiler’s own 
notes and are therefore called “unofficial nominative case reporters.” Eventually, the books were no 
longer identified by the individual reporter’s name. Thus, official reports and commercial reports 
replaced the “nominative” case reporters. Id. at 20 n.28 (“This accounts for the ‘nominative’ portion of 
early United States Supreme Court reports.”).  
 Neither the unofficial nominative reports nor the official reports were written by the judges 
themselves. Id. at 17. Rather, the reporters wrote both. Id. See infra note 49.  
 46. Form Molds Substance, supra note 44, at n.14 (citing HICKS, supra note 44, at 96). 
 47. Id. at 19. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. These “official” versions of the reports were more systematic in their coverage and were 
given official approval by the jurisdiction. Id. The major difference between the unofficial nominative 
reports and the official reports is that the former were written by a court reporter who was a “public-
spirited volunteer,” whereas the latter were written by a “state-appointed functionary.” Id. at 20 (citing 
Cal. Gov’t Code § 68900 (West 1976) as “an example of a statute creating the office of court 
reporter”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative 
of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 20 n.24 (1994) (citing Thomas A. Woxland, “Forever 
Associated with the Practice of Law”: The Early Years of the West Publishing Company,” 5 LEGAL 
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 115, 116 (1985)) [hereinafter Legal Research Universe]. 
 52. Woxland, supra note 51, at 115-16. 
 53. Id. 
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in the shortest possible time, the material which every judge and lawyer must 
use.”
54
 One of the major reasons that the West unofficial reporter system was 
so successful was that the official state reporters were slow and unreliable.
55
 
In fact, the office of the state reporter was more often than not delegated to a 
“political crony rather than an efficient publisher.”
56
  
John B. West made a major departure from prevailing practice when he 
decided to publish all judicial decisions, rather than choosing to publish only 
a selective number of them.
57
 Critics chided that such an approach deprived 
the reports of “any editorial judgment,” and some even called it a “waste-
basket” method of reporting.
58
 What was perceived as West Publishing 
Company’s weakness in the beginning, however, ultimately became one of 
its greatest strengths. According to Professor Robert Berring, lawyers 
supported the West system of universal publication of judicial decisions 
because they wanted “all precedent [to] be available.”
59
 In fact, West’s 
system of universal and comprehensive publishing gained such popularity in 
the legal community that it ultimately became “virtually impossible for 
another print publisher to ever challenge West’s market.”
60
  
In order to facilitate the retrieval of relevant cases from the multitude of 
cases that were published in the National Reporter System, West developed 
the American Digest System.
61
 The Digest System’s headnotes and 
keynumber indexing arrangement
62
 allows a researcher to find cases quickly 
and easily. Once a researcher thinks of a word that relates to a given legal 
issue, the researcher can look up the word in the Digest’s Descriptive-Word 
Index to find the subject-matter topics that are related to that word and other 
 
 
 54. A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L. REV. 396, 406 (1889), cited in Woxland, supra 
note 51, at 118-19. 
 55. Woxland, supra note 51, at 119. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 123. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Woxland, supra note 51, at 120. John West remarked that “it is one of the greatest merits of 
the National Reporter System that it gives all the cases.” A Symposium of Law Publishers, supra note 
54, at 406, quoted in Woxland, supra note 51, at 123. He also responded to an intended insult that his 
system was like a “blanket system” by replying that a blanket policy is the best kind of insurance 
policy, “and that is the sort of policy we issue for the lawyer seeking insurance against the loss of his 
case through ignorance of the law as set forth in the decisions of the highest courts.” Id., quoted in 
Woxland, supra note 51, at 123.  
 More than a century after West Publishing Company’s inception, no print publisher has been able 
to compete with West’s success in the field. Woxland, supra note 51, at 120. However, LEXIS is a 
significant competitor in the electronic publishing market. Id.  
 61. Woxland, supra note 51, at 120.  
 62. See infra note 64. 
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At the time that the West Publishing Company designed the American 
Digest System, fewer than one thousand cases per year were decided.
65
 This 
number rapidly multiplied throughout the twentieth century.
66
 When 
publication increased to tens of thousands of decisions per year, the 
precedent that emerged contained a confusing mass of often contradictory 
principles.
67
 The American Law Institute (ALI) attempted to remedy this 
inconsistency by creating the Restatement.
68
 The major purpose of the 
Restatement was to analyze the case law and extract the “best” principles and 
ignore the rest.
69
 The ALI wanted to replace case law with the Restatement, 
thereby making it unnecessary for lawyers to cite to cases.
70
 However, 
instead of adopting the ALI’s scheme, lawyers continued to cite cases as 




B. History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research 
In April 1973, the American system of legal research was transformed 
 
 
 63. MORRIS L. COHEN & KENT C. OLSON, LEGAL RESEARCH IN A NUTSHELL 44-45 (1992).  
 64. Id. The Digests contain hundreds of alphabetically-arranged topics that are subdivided into 
numbered sections called “key numbers.” Id. at 45. Each of these sections contains a collection of 
synopses that are taken directly from cases and give citations to those cases. Id. at 45-49. When the 
researcher finds a synopsis that looks relevant to the issue being researched, she can then go directly to 
the case itself in one of the West National Reporters. Id. 
 65. Legal Research Universe, supra note 51, at 27-28. 
 66. For example, in 1965, the number of federal circuit cases was 5,771; by 1970, the number 
had grown to 10,699; and by 1977, it was 17,784 cases. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, in 
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 164 (1977) 
[hereinafter 1977 ANNUAL REPORT] (cited in Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 8, at 1167 n.2). 
In 1980, the circuits disposed of 20,877 cases; by 1990, the number increased to 38,520; and in 1997, 
the number was 51,194. 1964 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 221.  
 When reading these statistics, it is important to recall that beginning in 1974, each federal 
appellate court began disposing of a portion of its opinions via unpublished opinions. During the year 
of 1990, for example, the total percentage of unpublished opinions in the federal circuits was 68.4%. 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS STATISTICAL TABLE S-3. By the year 2000, 
this percentage climbed to an alarming 79.5%. Id. The fact that nearly 80% of federal appellate cases 
are going unpublished, and therefore have no precedential power, is strong evidence of how our 
common law system of precedent is being “artificially” distorted. See infra Part III.  
 67. Form Molds Substance, supra note 44, at 22. 
 68. Id. at 23. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. According to Professor Berring, “The history of the Restatement and its evolution into a 
persuasive secondary authority shows that the comprehensive philosophy of reporting introduced by 
the West Company had too deeply infected the habits and goals of American legal researchers.” Id. 
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again when LEXIS launched the first-available computer-assisted legal 
research system.
72
 In 1975, Westlaw became LEXIS’ first and only 
commercial competitor when it created its own computer-assisted legal 
research system.
73
 LEXIS and Westlaw provide the full text, in digital 
format, of every case published in the West Reporters. Furthermore, half of 
the federal courts of appeals currently authorize LEXIS and Westlaw to 
provide the full text, in digital format, of their unpublished opinions.
74
 These 
on-line legal databases allow researchers to perform sophisticated word 
searches using Boolean logic.
75
 In effect, these services have freed the 
researcher from the strict boundaries imposed by the organizational system 
of the printed Digests.
76
  
The development of on-line research databases profoundly transformed 
the process of legal research.
77
 These databases continue to gain popularity, 
especially among the newest members of the legal community.
78
   
C. History of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts  
Throughout the first half of the Twentieth Century, litigation increased in 
America and, correspondingly, the number of judicial opinions multiplied at 
a fast pace.
79
 In the 1960s and early 1970s, the federal appellate courts 
authorized the publication of all judicial opinions, even single-word 
memorandum decisions.
80
 Because the West Publishing Company continued 
 
 
 72. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 556. See William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-
Assisted Legal Research, 77 LAW LIBR. J. 543, 552-53 (1985); Scott F. Burson, Report From the 
Electronic Trenches: An Update on Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 4 LEGAL REFERENCE 
SERVICES Q. 3 (1984).  
 73. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 556. 
 74. Hinderks & Leben, supra note 2, at 158. 
 75. Legal Research Universe, supra note 51, at 30. “Boolean logic allows the researcher to look 
for specific words or combinations of words in a document, specifying proximity if desired.” Id. 
 76. Id. 
The nature of electronic information is that it is stored in a manner dictated by the machine 
environment, and can be recalled in as many ways as one designs into the system. This means that 
one can pull up parts of the database, or the entire thing, in a variety of arrangements limited only 
by the system’s design and the searcher’s creativity. 
Id. at 28. 
 77. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
 78. Legal Research Universe, supra note 51, at 31. For example, Law Librarian Charles Ten 
Brink of the University of Chicago humorously noted that “librarians urging the law students to use 
the old paper-based systems for legal research were like people urging folks to eat vegetables at a 
buffet, while the LEXIS and Westlaw representatives were offering them a table of Big Macs and 
Twinkies.” Id. 
 79. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 80. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 546 (citing, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of 
Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 
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its practice of universal publication, tens of thousands of cases were added to 
the books each year.
81
 In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States
82
 
responded to the unlimited production of published opinions by 
recommending that the federal courts of appeals authorize for publication 
solely the opinions “which were of general precedential value.”
83
 This 
recommendation was too broad, however, to effectively curtail the number of 
opinions that were published each year.
84
  
In 1972, the Judicial Conference of the United States acknowledged the 
inconsistency and inefficiency with which the various circuit courts had 
attempted to implement its 1964 recommendation.
85
 According to a report 
from the Board of the Federal Judicial Center,
86
 all of the circuits agreed that 
too many opinions were being published, but they lacked a unanimous 
approach to limit publication.
87
 The Judicial Conference responded to the 
Federal Judicial Center’s recommendation that the circuit courts change their 
publication rules by requesting: 
[E]ach circuit council to review its publication policy and to 
implement the following modifications: 
 a. Opinions will not be published unless ordered by a majority of 
the panel rendering the decision; 




 81. Form Molds Substance, supra note 44, at 22. 
 82. The Judicial Conference of the United States is “the governing body of the lower federal 
courts for administrative purposes.” Arnold, supra note 15, at 219. For more information on the 
Judicial Conference, see 1964 Annual Report, supra note 15, at i, ii (reprinting 28 U.S.C. § 331 (n.d.), 
which gives a lengthy description of the Judicial Conference of the United States). 
 83. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 546 (quoting 1964 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.  
 84. Kerri L. Klover, Comment, “Order Opinions”—the Public’s Perception of Injustice, 21 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1225, 1238 (1996). For an in-depth discussion of the formation of the 
nonpublication rules, see Donna Stienstra, Unpublished Dispositions: Problems of Access and Use in 
the Courts of Appeals, MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS 497, 501-08 (1998), cited by Klover, 
supra note 84, at 1238 n.59. 
 85. Klover, supra note 84, at 1238. 
 86. “The Federal Judicial Center was established in 1967 by the Federal Judicial Center Act, 
Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (1976)).” Non-Precedential 
Precedent, supra note 8, at 1170 n.18. “The Act specifies four functions of the Center: (1) to research 
and study the operation of the federal court system; (2) to develop improved techniques of judicial 
administration; (3) to stimulate, create, and conduct programs of continuing education and training for 
all personnel of the federal judiciary; and (4) to provide staff, research, and planning assistance to the 
Judicial Conference of the United States. 28 U.S.C § 620(b) (1976).” Id. For more information about 
the Center, see Tom C. Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537 (1974), cited in Non-
Precedential Precedent, supra note 8, at 1170 n.18 (“The author, Justice Tom C. Clark, served as the 
first Director of the Center.”).  
 87. Klover, supra note 84, at 1238-39 (citing Stienstra, supra note 84, at 501). 
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 c. When an opinion is not published the public record shall be 
completed by publishing the judgment of the Court.
88
 
In response to these optional guidelines, each circuit court developed its 
own unique publication plan by 1974.
89
 Essentially, the limited publication 
and no-citation rules of the circuit courts’ publication plans were designed to 
promote efficiency by preventing the publication of routine, “easy,” cases 
that were decided merely upon factual issues or by the application of 
previously established legal principles.
90
 As one scholar articulated, 
publication plans limiting the publication of opinions “[are] intended to serve 
as a sorting device, separating the wheat from the chaff. Opinions that have 
general precedential value or other public significance are separated from 
those that do not.”
91
  
Judges attempt to “separate the wheat from the chaff”
92
 by following the 
guidelines contained in their circuit’s publication plan.
93
 Each publication 
plan’s guidelines are intended to assist judges in deciding whether to publish 
or not to publish an opinion.
94
 The guidelines vary in detail from circuit to 
circuit; however, the common theme of all of the guidelines is that when a 
judge decides, in the judge’s discretion, that a case is unlikely to have future 




The guidelines have different ways of helping judges decide which cases 
are likely to have future precedential value. For example, “half of the circuits 
use an amorphous test, exemplified by the Second Circuit’s standard of 
whether any ‘jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written 
opinion.’”
96
 The rest of the circuits “have developed specific criteria, such as 
whether the opinion establishes a new rule of law, involves an issue of 






 88. Id. at 1238 (quoting Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 8, at 1170). 
 89. Id. at 1239. 
 90. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 548. 
 91. Id. at 551. 
 92. See supra note 91. 
 93. Slavitt, supra note 6, at 120.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 551.  
 96. Slavitt, supra note 6 at 120, 142 n.67 (citing 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 3D CIR. R. APP. I, I.O.P. 5.5.1; 
10TH CIR. R. 36.1; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2; FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b)). 
 97. Slavitt, supra note 6 at 120, 142 n.68 (citing 1ST. CIR. R. 36.2(a); 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); 5TH CIR. 
R. 47.5.1; 6TH CIR. R. 36; 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1); 8TH CIR. R. APP. I, at 4; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. CIR. R. 
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By leaving the decision of whether to publish a judicial opinion entirely to 
the discretion of judges, the publication plans allow judges to decide which 
cases become “law” and which ones do not. Published opinions become 
“law” because they are given precedential effect, whereas unpublished 
opinions are deprived of precedential effect. 
The appellate courts have modified their respective publication plans 
since the plans’ inception.
98
 In their current format, the publication plans of 
the various circuits diverge in two important ways. First, the publication plan 
may specify whether or not litigants have permission to cite unpublished 
opinions. Second, the publication plan may specify the level of authority the 
circuit grants to cited unpublished opinions. As to the first point of 
divergence, the plans’ permission to cite unpublished opinions fall into one 
of the following three categories: (1) six circuits absolutely prohibit citation 
to unpublished opinions in unrelated cases;
99
 (2) four circuits disfavor 
citation to unpublished opinions in unrelated cases; and (3) two circuits 
openly permit citation to unpublished opinions.
100
  
The six federal appellate courts in the first category impose an absolute 
prohibition on citation to unpublished opinions in unrelated cases. These 
courts are the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
Federal, First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
101
  




 98. See supra note 12. 
 99. The term “related cases” is used in this discussion to refer to cases involving “res judicata, 
estoppel, or law of the case.” See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(c). The term “unrelated cases” is used in this 
discussion to refer to cases that do not involve “res judicata, estoppel, or law of the case.” Id. 
 100. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 569. The fact that a circuit allows citation to unpublished 
opinions does not necessarily mean that the circuit grants precedential authority to that unpublished 
opinion. The circuit might grant only persuasive authority to its unpublished opinions. For a fuller 
discussion, see infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 101. See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c) (citation of unpublished opinions permitted only “when the binding or 
preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is relevant”); 1ST CIR. R. 
36.2(b)(6) (“Unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases. Only published opinions may be 
cited otherwise.”); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (Unpublished opinions “shall not be cited or otherwise used in 
unrelated cases.”). 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (“Except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel or law of the case, [unpublished opinions] shall not be cited or used as precedent.”); 9TH CIR. 
R. 36-3 (Unpublished opinions “shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited to or by this 
Court . . . except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral 
estoppel.”).  
 Court rules contained in each circuit’s publication plan are subject to judicial modification at any 
time. See supra note 12. For this reason, a researcher or practitioner should use the most current 
version of the rules. 7 FEDERAL LOCAL COURTS RULES: COURTS OF APPEALS RULES (3d ed. 2001) is a 
loose leaf service updated every two months as needed. Several courts of appeals publish their local 
rules on the Internet, which may be more current. Links to the circuit courts’ official Internet sites are 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/courts of appeals. 
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opinions, but they disfavor such citation in unrelated cases and in cases 
where a published opinion would serve as well. In other words, these circuits 
strongly prefer that litigants cite to unpublished opinions only in related cases 
or in cases where no published opinion would serve as well. These four 




The only circuit in the third category, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, openly permits citation to unpublished opinions.
103
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit falls into either the 
second or the third category, depending on the year in which the unpublished 
opinion was issued.
104
 Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit lacks a rule that addresses the question whether citation to 
unpublished opinions is prohibited or permitted.
105
 
The second point of divergence among the circuit publication plans is the 
level of authority each circuit grants to cited unpublished opinions. In circuits 
that permit citation to unpublished opinions, the court may grant cited 
unpublished opinions either persuasive authority or precedential authority. 
This distinction is extremely important. The grant of only persuasive 
authority means that the court is not bound to follow the holdings contained 
in its unpublished opinions in future cases with similar facts. Conversely, the 
grant of precedential authority requires the court to follow the holdings of its 
 
 
 102. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(c) (“Citation of this Court’s unpublished dispositions . . . is disfavored, 
except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case.”); 6TH CIR. R. 
28(g) (allowing citation of unpublished decisions only where no published opinion would serve as 
well, and for res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case); 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (“Unpublished 
opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them . . . [unless relevant to] res 
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any unpublished 
opinion . . . . [or] if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of 
this or another court would serve as well.”); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(B)(1-2) (“Citation of an unpublished 
decision is disfavored. But an unpublished decision may be cited if: (1) it has persuasive value with 
respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion; and (2) it would assist 
the court in its disposition.”).  
 103. 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions . . . may be cited as persuasive authority . . . .”).  
 104. The Fifth Circuit actually has two different rules: one applies to unpublished opinions issued 
before January 1, 1996, and the other applies to unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 1996. 
The former rule falls into the second category listed above in note 102, and the latter rule falls into the 
third category listed above in note 103. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3 (“Unpublished opinions issued before 
January 1, 1996, . . . should normally be cited only when the doctrine of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel or law of the case is applicable . . . .”); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (“Unpublished opinions issued on 
or after January 1, 1996 . . . may be cited . . . .”).  
 105. A rule in the Third Circuit’s Internal Operating Procedures comes closest to addressing this 
question. 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.8 states: “Because the court historically has not regarded unpublished 
opinions as precedents that bind the court . . . the court by tradition does not cite to its unpublished 
opinions as authority.” This rule clarifies that the court itself does not cite to its unpublished opinions, 
but does not mention whether or not litigants may cite to its unpublished opinions.  
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unpublished opinions in future cases with similar facts. 
In the six circuits that prohibit citation to unpublished opinions in 
unrelated cases, obviously, unpublished opinions are granted neither 
precedential nor persuasive authority.
106
 Of the remaining circuits, the 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits grant unpublished opinions only 
persuasive authority.
107
 Two circuits, the Fourth and Sixth, grant unpublished 
opinions precedential authority, albeit only in related cases or in cases where 
no published opinion would serve as well.
108
 The Fifth Circuit grants 
unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 1996, persuasive authority only, 
but it grants unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 1996, precedential 
authority.
109
 The Third Circuit lacks a rule that addresses the question of 
whether unpublished opinions are granted even persuasive authority.
110
 
D. Precedent and Stare Decisis 
Our common law system is founded upon the united doctrines of 
precedent and stare decisis.
111
 The earliest of the American courts 
implemented the doctrine of precedent.
112
 Chief Justice John Marshall, one 
of the founding fathers of our current legal system, explained that “[i]nherent 
in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general 
principal or rule of law.”
113
 Throughout the centuries following the Marshall 
Court, the United States Supreme Court has continued to honor the notion 
that such “declarations and interpretations” of the law “must be applied in 





 106. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 107. See 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2. 
 108. The rules of these two circuits disfavor citation to unpublished opinions. However, each court 
permits their citation “[i]f a party believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition has 
precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no published opinion that 
would serve as well.” 6TH CIR. R. 28(g). See also 4TH CIR. R. 36(c).  
 109. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3 to .4 (“Unpublished opinions issued before January 1, 1996, are 
precedent . . . . Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent, except 
under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.”).  
 110. See supra note 105. 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.8 states that the court does not grant precedential 
authority to unpublished opinions, but does not clarify whether or not it grants persuasive authority to 
such opinions. 
 111. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does 
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 
AM. U. L. REV. 757, 766-85 (1995). 
 112. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 113. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 
899 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 114. 223 F.3d at 900 (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); 
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 399 (1821)). 
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The doctrine of “stare decisis”
115
 is linked to the doctrine of precedent. 
Whereas “[t]he general theory of precedent encouraged citing precedents en 
masse to illustrate for the court the nature of the law on the question 
involved,”
116
 the doctrine of stare decisis “reaches its apogee when a single 
precedent is considered to be a ‘binding’ authority.”
117
 Thus, the doctrine of 
stare decisis is “utterly dependent” upon published opinions.
118
 Because a 
reliable and comprehensive system of publishing judicial opinions was not 
instituted in the United States until the late nineteenth century,
119
 stare decisis 
is a relatively new doctrine.
120
  
Together, the doctrine of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis 
promote what one law professor describes as the “core values that lend 
legitimacy to the judicial process.”
121
 According to Professor Dragich, these 





The various publication plans of the Federal Appellate Courts that deprive 
unpublished opinions of precedential authority are inherently flawed. The 
plans violate the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis
123
 and artificially 
distort our common law system.
124
  
As discussed in Part II.D of this Note, the doctrines of precedent and stare 
 
 
 115. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “stare decisis” as follows: “[Latin ‘to stand by things 
decided’] The doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 In other words, 
[w]hen a point or principle of law has been . . . settled by the ruling of a competent court in a case 
in which it is directly and necessarily involved, it will no longer be considered as open . . . to a 
new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are bound to follow its adjudications, unless it 
be for urgent reasons and in exceptional cases. 
WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 321 (3d ed. 
1914), quoted in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999). 
 116. Dragich, supra note 111, at 773. 
 117. Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800-1850, 3 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 29 (1959), quoted in Dragich, supra note 111, at 773. 
 118. Dragich, supra note 111, at 773. 
 119. See supra Part II.A. 
 120. Dragich, supra note 111, at 773. 
 121. Id. at 777. 
 122. Id. For an in-depth analysis of each of these enumerated “core values,” see Dragich, supra 
note 111, at 777-81. 
 123. See supra Part II.D. 
 124. Slavitt, supra note 6, at 125. 
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decisis depend entirely on published opinions.
125
 The doctrine of precedent 
involves citing to as many helpful cases as a litigant can find.
126
 The doctrine 
of stare decisis involves using a single precedent as “binding” authority.
127
 
When a litigant finds a case that is directly on point, the rules of precedent 
and stare decisis normally require the court to grant “binding” authority to 
that case.
128
 However, if the case is contained in an unpublished opinion, the 
court’s publication plan allows the court to ignore both doctrines.
129
 Rather 
than grant “binding” authority to the case, the court need not grant any 
authority to the case.
130
  
The fundamental policies underlying the doctrines of precedent and stare 
decisis apply to unpublished opinions just as they do to published 
opinions.
131
 According to Chief Judge William J. Holloway, Jr. of the Tenth 
Circuit, for example, “[t]he most important reasons for permitting citation of 
published precedents are just as cogent to me in the case of unpublished 
rulings.”
132
 He reasoned that “[e]ach ruling, published or unpublished, 
involves the facts of a particular case and the application of law to the case. 
Therefore, all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or not, and we 
cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning their citation.”
133
  
Judge Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit similarly proclaims that the 
policies underlying the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis are equally 
applicable to unpublished and to published opinions.
134
 Judge Arnold asserts 
that under a proper application of the doctrine of precedent, “judges must 
respect what they have done in the past, whether or not it is printed in a 
book.”
135
 The publication plans that deprive unpublished opinions of 
 
 
 125. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
 126. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra Part II.C. 
 130. As one scholar noted, “[with nonpublication] [s]tare decisis is twice diminished. First, the 
decision itself is freed from the responsibility to reason within full view. Second, an increment of 
precedent is rendered unusable.” THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE 
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL 130 (1994), quoted in Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 555. 
 131. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 132. Re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Adopted November 18, 
1986, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Arnold, supra note 15, at 225. Like Chief Judge Holloway, Judge Arnold believes that 
every judicial decision, whether published or unpublished, should be given precedential effect. Id. 
 135. Id. Judge Arnold stated that the Eighth Circuit’s publication plan “says, quite plainly, that 
[the doctrine of precedent] applies only when the court wants it to apply.” Id. at 221. Furthermore, “if 
we decided a case directly on point yesterday, lawyers may not even remind us of this fact. The bar is 
gagged. We are perfectly free to depart from past opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to 
publish them is entirely our own choice.” Id. 
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precedential authority thus violate the doctrines of precedent and stare 
decisis, which apply equally to unpublished and published opinions. 
Not only do such publication plans violate the doctrines of precedent and 
stare decisis, but they also artificially distort our common law system.
136
 By 
leaving the decision of whether to publish a judicial opinion entirely to the 
discretion of judges, the publication plans allow judges to decide which cases 
become “law” and which do not.
137
 Published opinions become “law” 
because courts grant them future precedential authority.
138
 In contrast, 




As a result of this process, the body of American common law no longer 
flows naturally as each new judicial opinion is added to the river of 
precedent.
140
 Instead, publication plans allow judges to decide which 
opinions join the river and which ones do not.
141
 When judges exercise their 
discretion and withhold thousands of judicial opinions from publication, they 
actually distort our common law system.
142
 
Judges decide which opinions become “law” based solely on their 
guesses as to whether a particular opinion is likely to have future 
“precedential value.”
143
 In other words, the publication plans are “intended to 
serve as a sorting device, separating the wheat from the chaff.”
144
 However, 
“separating the wheat from the chaff” is not as easy as it sounds. Judges 





 136. Slavitt, supra note 6, at 125. 
 137. See supra Part II.C. 
 138. See supra Part II.C. 
 139. See supra Part II.C. 
 140. See supra Part II.D. 
 141. See supra Part II.C. 
 142. Slavitt drew an analogy between the judges and a sculptor: “Our system of precedent has 
become subtractive as well as additive. Like a sculpture, it is shaped as much by what is removed as by 
what is added.” Slavitt, supra note 6, at 109.  
 143. Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 551. 
 144. Id. See also text accompanying note 91. 
 145. According to Chief Judge Holloway of the Tenth Circuit, for example: 
[W]hen we make our ad hoc determination that a ruling is not significant enough for publication, 
we are not in as informed a position as we might believe. Future developments may well reveal 
that the ruling is significant indeed. . . . The classifications are too fine in many instances and we 
cannot confidently say, in deciding whether to publish, that we are not working an injustice on 
parties in later cases. 
Re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Adopted November 18, 1986, 
955 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
 Similarly, United States Supreme Court Justice Stevens stated that this process “rests on a false 
premise” because it “assumes that an author [of a judicial opinion] is a reliable judge of the quality and 
importance of his own work product . . . . Judges are the last persons who should be authorized to 
determine which of their decisions should be long remembered.” Remarks of Justice Stevens, Illinois 
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Thus, they might make an incorrect guess by deciding not to publish an 
opinion that subsequently turns out to be quite important.
146
 In fact, scholars 
and judges alike have observed that a disturbingly large number of important 
cases are unpublished, and therefore nonprecedential, opinions.
147
 Authors 
Reynolds and Richman poignantly refer to unpublished opinions that 
arguably should have been published as cases of “suppressed precedent.”
148
  
One example of “suppressed precedent” is the unpublished opinion 
Johnson v. Knable.
149
 In Johnson, a prison inmate applied for a job in the 
prison’s education department and was turned down.
150
 The prisoner filed 
suit against the prison, alleging that he was denied the position because he 
was gay and that this was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
151
 The 
Fourth Circuit held that the prison officials might, in fact, have violated the 
prisoner’s equal protection rights if they discriminated against the prisoner on 
 
 
State Bar Association’s Centennial Dinner, Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 22, 1977), quoted in Non-
Precedential Precedent, supra note 8, at 1192. 
 Professor Dragich likewise states, “Often, the determination whether or not a particular opinion is 
law-making cannot be made until years later, when further developments in the law demonstrate what 
the authoring judge could not forecast.” Dragich, supra note 111, at 784. 
 As another scholar aptly noted, “experience shows that there are gems among the unpublished 
decisions.” Braun, supra note 8, at 94. 
 146. See infra note 147. 
 147. According to one commentator, “Numerous studies have demonstrated that a significant 
number of these unpublished decisions involve cases that are non-routine, law-making, or politically 
significant.” Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 568. Among the sources Shuldberg cites are: Pamela Foa, A 
Snake in the Path of Law: The Seventh Circuit’s Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309, 315-
38 (1977) (“evaluating all unpublished orders issued by the Seventh Circuit over a six month period 
and concluding that ‘cases are being decided which (if given precedential effect would) create new 
law’”); James N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit’s Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A. 
J. 1224, 1226 (1975) (“noting Ninth Circuit unpublished cases that, ‘if published, would set 
precedent’”); William L Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in 
the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 584-86, 606-11 
(1981) (“noting that the results of a sample of the published and unpublished opinions of the federal 
courts of appeals during the 1978-78 Reporting Year revealed a number of instances of cases that 
ought to have been published but were not, including cases which resolved novel issues of state and 
federal law, as well as ‘decisions suggesting that statutes, agencies, or the courts themselves are not 
performing up to par’”); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished 
Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 
946 n.33 (1989) (citing an unpublished report to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit that “stud[ied] all Ninth Circuit opinions issued during a one year period, classifying the 
unpublished opinions by subject matter, and analyzing their information value”); Donald R. Songer, 
Criteria For Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical 
Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 313 (1990) (“noting that a ‘significant number of the unpublished 
decisions of the courts of appeals appear to involve cases which are non-routine [and] sometimes 
politically significant’”). Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 555. 
 148. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 147, at 606. 
 149. No. 88-7729, 1988 WL 119136 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 150. 1988 WL 119136, at **1. 
 151. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship











the basis of his sexual orientation.
152
  
Johnson would have attracted a lot of attention had it been published 
because it “arguably would have made homosexuality subject to strict 
scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause.”
153
 Whether 
homosexuality should be considered a “suspect classification that triggers 
increased judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is hotly 
debated.”
154
 The issue was one of first impression in the Fourth Circuit; 




Although the Fourth Circuit disfavors citation to unpublished opinions, it 
permits a litigant to cite an unpublished opinion if the lawyer believes that 
the unpublished opinion “has precedential value . . . and there is no published 
opinion that would serve as well.”
156
 Thus, in Johnson the Fourth Circuit 
created a new legal rule with potential precedential authority, but then “hid it 
from public scrutiny.”
157
 Moreover, by issuing an unpublished opinion, the 
Fourth Circuit effectively “shielded its decision from Supreme Court 
review”
158
 because the Supreme Court is far less likely to grant certiorari to 




One scholar asserts that the strategy used by the Fourth Circuit 
“accentuates the judiciary’s power to act without the restraint contemplated 
by our governmental structure. Although a counter-majoritarian judiciary 
exercises a valuable constitutional ‘check’ over the political branches, its 
decisions should at least be subject to public scrutiny and review by a higher 
court.”
160
 According to that scholar, the Fourth Circuit’s disposition of 
Johnson as an unpublished opinion “illustrates how nonpublication may be 
used to hide controversial decisions.”
161
 
The decision not to publish an opinion that otherwise would have 
 
 
 152. Id. “If Johnson was denied a prison work assignment simply because of his sexual 
orientation, his equal protection rights may have been violated.” Id. 
 153. Slavitt, supra note 6, at 128.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 4TH CIR. R. 36(c). See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 157. Slavitt, supra note 6, at 128. Unpublished opinions often go unnoticed because the public 
assumes that had those cases contained important principles, the opinions would have been published. 
See supra text accompanying note 144.  
 158. Slavitt, supra note 6, at 128. 
 159. Id. “The Court already grants less than ten percent of all certiorari requests.” Id. at 127. 
 160. Id. at 129.  
 161. Id. at 128. A number of scholars and at least one judge fear that publication plans create the 
potential for judges to use unpublished opinions as a convenient means of “sweeping under the rug” 
certain controversial decisions. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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significant value to future litigants artificially distorts our common law 
system.
162
 Distortion occurs whether the judge inadvertently predicts that the 
case has no future precedential value
163
 or intentionally sweeps a 
controversial issue under the rug.
164
 Either way, publication plans that 
deprive unpublished opinions of precedential authority create substantial 
disadvantages for future litigants. Every litigant who finds an unpublished 
opinion on-point cannot ask the court to honor the doctrines of precedent and 
stare decisis that would otherwise compel the court to follow the decision.
165
 
Fortunately, the incredible technological advances that have occurred 
during the past few decades offer a source of relief for the problems created 
by the publication plans of the federal circuit courts.
166
 As discussed in Part 
II.C of this Note, the federal courts previously authorized the publication of 
all judicial opinions.
167
 When litigation increased such that tens of thousands 
of cases were added to the books every year, however, the Judicial 
Conference found it no longer practical to store such massive amounts of 
printed material.
168
 The Conference subsequently recommended that the 
circuit courts drastically reduce the number of opinions authorized for 
publication.
169
 Significantly, the Conference made this recommendation 
prior to the advent of computer-assisted legal research.
170
 Today, on-line 
legal databases save enormous amounts of physical storage space.
171
 As a 
result, publication plans that artificially distort our common law system are 
no longer necessary.
172
    
 
 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 136-48. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 136-48. 
 164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 125-35. 
 166. See supra Part II.C. 
 167. See supra Part II.C. 
 168. See supra Part II.C. 
 169. See supra Part II.C. 
 170. See supra Part II.B. 
 171. See supra Part II.B. 
 172. In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee declined to recommend universal publication 
of judicial opinions at that time but stated that “inexpensive database access and computerized search 
technologies may justify revisiting the issue, because these developments may now or soon will 
provide wide and inexpensive access to all opinions.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE APRIL 2, 1990 130-31 (1990), cited in Frank 
M. Coffin, Research for Efficiency and Quality: Review of Managing Appeals in Federal Courts, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1857, 1864 (1990). Technological advances do, indeed, “justify revisiting the issue” 
now because we no longer must be constrained by limitations on the amount of available physical 
storage space. 
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This Note proposes that the United States Supreme Court use the Rules 
Enabling Act
173
 to create a uniform rule regarding the precedential authority 
of unpublished opinions in the federal appellate courts.
174
 This uniform rule 
should grant precedential authority to all opinions, whether published or 
unpublished. To facilitate public access to unpublished judicial opinions, this 
Note proposes that the federal government fund a single Web site designed 
solely for the electronic dissemination of federal court opinions.
175
 
This Note proposes that, instead of calling these electronically 
disseminated opinions “unpublished opinions,”  they be named “digital 
opinions.”
176
 Appellate judges and publishing companies would still decide 
which judicial opinions to publish in books; the remaining opinions would be 
disseminated to the public as digital opinions.
177
 This proposal would grant 
precedential authority to all judicial opinions, whether published or digital. 
All opinions, both published and digital, are, at their core, “a declaration and 
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law.”
178
 This proposal asserts 
that the only meaningful difference between the two is the medium by which 
 
 
 173. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 174. A uniform rule would provide clarification and unity among the circuit courts of appeals. 
Dunn, supra note 12, at 146. A uniform rule would also limit “circuit shopping.” Id. at 147.  
 A uniform rule was not enacted when the publication plans initially were implemented because 
the Judicial Conference wanted the courts to experiment with a variety of different plans. REPORTS OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (1974), quoted in 
Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 546-47. The Judicial Conference stated that the resulting variety of plans 
was analogous to “11 legal laboratories accumulating experience and amending their publication plans 
on the basis of that experience.” Id. 
 Only a few years after the publication plans initially were enacted, scholars began calling for the 
enactment of a uniform plan. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 12, at 146-47. In 1977, for example, one 
scholar noted that “[a]lthough courts have recognized the value of experimentation, in this instance 
long-term experimentation is not warranted. The various circuits have had between three and seven 
years’ experience in developing standards and procedures related to unreported decisions.” Id. 
(emphasis added).   
 Today, more than twenty-three years after the implementation of each circuit’s amended 
publication plan, the federal circuit courts still lack a cohesive approach to publishing their judicial 
opinions. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to enact a 
uniform plan.  
 175. See supra note 40.  
 176. This change in terminology is proposed because the term “unpublished opinion” has become 
synonymous with “unimportant” or “junk” opinion. According to authors Reynolds and Richman, for 
example, “unpublished dispositions are also dreadful in quality . . . . It is no wonder, therefore, that 
former Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit once told his Circuit Conference that unpublished 
decisions were ‘junk’ opinions.” Requiem, supra note 8, at 284. See supra note 8. 
 177. Legal researchers without Internet access can seek the assistance of law librarians and public 
libraries. See infra text accompanying note 181.  
 178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 
899-900 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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they are disseminated to the public.  
The design of the universal Web site that would disseminate digital 
opinions should include a powerful search engine to facilitate legal 
researchers’ accessibility to relevant cases.
179
 Because this Web site would 
not attempt to make a profit, the cost of accessing it would be substantially 
less than commercial providers.
180
 Even those who cannot afford expensive 
Internet products or who do not own computers would be able to access this 
Web site from computers in public libraries.
181
 
Finally, this proposal will not increase the burden on judges. Judges will 
continue to write the same number of opinions irrespective of their 
publication status. The implementation of this proposal would simply honor 
the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis by granting precedential authority 




In conclusion, the publication plans that deprive unpublished opinions of 
precedential authority are inherently flawed because they violate the 
doctrines of precedent and stare decisis, and they artificially distort our 
common law system.
183
 Courts implemented these publication plans in 
response to increased concern that law libraries would not have enough space 
 
 
 179. A search engine similar to the ones used by the most comprehensive commercial databases 
would allow researchers to perform sophisticated word searches using Boolean logic. See supra note 
42 and accompanying text. 
 180. Of course, this Web site would merely provide the judicial opinions from the federal courts 
and, therefore, commercial databases would still be able to profit from the other sophisticated 
commercial on-line services that they offer. 
 181. See supra note 177. 
 182. The reader need not automatically assume that granting precedential effect to every judicial 
opinion will create massive confusion for judges. According to one scholar, “[a] string of decisions 
might ultimately reach the same result, thus solidifying, rather than weakening the understanding of 
that topic of law.” Shuldberg, supra note 11, at 561. In fact, this scholar quotes the following statement 
made by Judge Posner: “Despite the vast number of published opinions, most federal circuit judges 
will confess that a surprising fraction of federal appeals are difficult to decide, not because there are 
too many precedents but because there are too few on point.” Id., quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 123 (1985).  
 Similarly, Professor Peter A. Joy explained,  
The larger the number of precedents, however, the more predictable the outcome in a particular 
case is likely to be, and the less likely, therefore, that it will go to trial or be appealed. Conversely, 
increasing the number of unpublished opinions will stunt the law’s development and ultimately 
lead to more, rather than less, litigation. Without the reliance on prior decisions to create 
precedent, litigants and courts must continue to revisit issues. This leads to a wasting of court 
resources, unnecessary legal fees and a confusion of conflicting results. 
Joy, supra note 2, at A19-20.  
 183. See supra Part III. 
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to store the thousands of opinions added to books each year.
184
 Courts 
enacted these plans prior to the advent of computer-assisted legal research.
185
 
Today, we have the technological capability to store massive amounts of 
information digitally.
186
 Thus, the major reason for the original enactment of 
the publication plans no longer justifies their use.
187
 The time has come for 
the United States Supreme Court to enact a uniform rule granting 
precedential authority to all federal judicial opinions.
188
 
As one commentator aptly remarked, “[I]f we succeed in using every 
resource, including technology, to continue the delivery of justice and the 
preservation of liberty in a free society, [Judge Learned] Hand may one day 








 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. See supra Part II.B. 
 186. See supra Part II.B. 
 187. See supra Part III. 
 188. See supra Part IV. 
 189. HOWARD T. MARKEY, THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 198 
(Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989). 
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